Anti-Defection

Political defection is the abandoning of a political party by a member of the legislature after getting the mandate from the electors on whose party symbol they were elected; it amounts to a betrayal of the people’s mandate. Identified as the elected representative's willful abandonment of the party affiliation. The abandonment is done either by joining any other political party or by forming a new party.

The Anti-Defection Law in India, embedded through the insertion of the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, is intended to provide for stability in the political system and uphold the people's mandate by rendering it difficult for elected members of the legislature to switch parties after having been elected. The people's mandate connotes the trust and choice that the voters express through the electoral process and is frequently associated with the party whose ticket a candidate has been elected to office. The device of the party whip strengthens the party discipline in that it expects the elected representatives to act strictly according to party directions during significant votes, particularly on confidence motions and other important legislative matters. Any breach of the direction of the whip may subject the member to disqualification under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.

In spite of these provisions, instances of large-scale political realignment have occurred in a few states. Thus, in Karnataka (2019), 17 MLAs resigned and brought down the coalition government, with the Supreme Court later ruling that such acts defeated the very purpose of the Tenth Schedule but allowed the disqualified MLAs to contest in the subsequent elections. Similarly, political upheavals were witnessed in Arunachal Pradesh (2016), Maharashtra (2022) {39 MLA}, Bihar (2022), and Goa (2019 and 2022) through mergers, mass resignations and shifts that threw up some intricate questions concerning the interpretation and application of the Anti-Defection Law.

The law upholds democratic choices of electorates, based on timeliness, and unbiased decision making of Speakers. Protections would also improve under judicial scrutiny.

Genesis Of the Word

Genesis of the word ‘defection’ The term defection has its genesis in the Latin word ‘defection,’ meaning “an act of abandonment of a person or a cause to which such person is bound because of allegiance or duty, or to which he has willfully attached himself. The term defection indicates revolt, dissent, and rebellion by a person or a party. Generally, defection in a political scenario indicates leaving the political party to join another or form a new party. Traditionally, this phenomenon is known as 'floor crossing,' which had its origin in the British House of Commons, where a legislator changed his allegiance when he crossed the floor and moved from the Government to the Opposition side, or vice versa.

Constitutional Evolution of Anti-defection

The landmark judgment of the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Others (1992 SCR (1) 686) laid down critical judicial interpretations of key terms and doctrines within the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, which governs disqualification on grounds of defection. One of the central phrases—“voluntarily giving up membership”—was expansively interpreted by the Court to mean not only formal resignation from a political party, but also any conduct that implicitly or explicitly indicates disloyalty, such as public criticism or defiance of party directives. The Court also examined the phrase “any direction” under Paragraph 2(1)(b), noting that it must not be used in a manner that excessively restricts an elected representative’s right to dissent and freedom of speech, which are essential components of parliamentary democracy.

Significantly, the Court scrutinized the finality of the Speaker’s decision under Paragraph 6(1). Although the Tenth Schedule initially claimed that the Speaker’s or Chairman’s decision would be final, the Court held that this finality does not preclude judicial review. It clarified that decisions made by the Speaker are subject to challenge under Articles 136, 226, and 227 of the Constitution in instances of mala fide action, perversity, or violation of constitutional mandates. The Court thus reaffirmed judicial review as part of the Constitution’s basic structure. Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule, which attempted to bar courts from intervening in disqualification matters, was struck down on the grounds that it curtailed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts and had not been ratified by half of the states, as required by the proviso to Article 368(2). By applying the doctrine of severability, the Court preserved the rest of the Tenth Schedule while invalidating only Paragraph 7.

The judgment also addressed the impartiality of the Speaker, acknowledging the potential for bias since Speakers often maintain party affiliations. However, the Court did not remove their adjudicatory role but emphasized that the availability of judicial review serves as a check against misuse of power. In essence, Kihoto Hollohan defined and clarified the operational scope of anti-defection provisions, balancing the need for political stability and party discipline with constitutional values of representative democracy, judicial oversight, and individual freedom of expression within legislative bodies.

Anti-Defection as Defined in Legislation

While the Constitution does not give a single-line definition, the Tenth Schedule outlines the circumstances under which legislators can be disqualified for defection.

Broadly, a member of a legislature can be disqualified if:

They voluntarily give up the membership of their party (this includes public statements or actions that suggest disloyalty).

They vote or abstain from voting in the legislature contrary to the directions of their party (the whip), without prior permission.

Legal provision(s) relating to Anti-Defection

Article 101 – Vacation of Seats in Parliament This Article lays down conditions under which a Member of Parliament vacates their seat. It becomes relevant in the context of anti-defection in the following ways:

Clause (3)(a): A member’s seat becomes vacant if they are disqualified under Article 102, including disqualification on the grounds of defection under the Tenth Schedule.

Clause (3)(b): A member may resign by writing under their hand, but the resignation must be accepted by the Speaker/Chairman. If the resignation is found to be involuntary or not genuine, it may be rejected.

Clause (4): If a member is absent from all meetings of the House without permission for a continuous period of 60 days, the House may declare the seat vacant.

Article 102 – Disqualifications for Membership of Parliament This Article specifies the grounds for disqualification from either House of Parliament. Of particular relevance is:

Clause (1)(e): A person shall be disqualified if they are disqualified under any law made by Parliament, which includes the Tenth Schedule. This clause provides the constitutional basis for disqualification on grounds of defection.

Article 190 – Vacation of Seats in State Legislatures This provision mirrors Article 101 but applies to State Legislatures. A member of a State Legislature may vacate their seat under circumstances such as:

Clause (3)(a): Disqualification under Article 191, including under the Tenth Schedule.

Clause (3)(b): Resignation, subject to the Speaker's satisfaction that it is voluntary and genuine.

Clause (4): Absence from all meetings of the House without permission for 60 days may result in vacation of the seat.

Article 191 – Disqualifications for Membership of State Legislatures This Article parallels Article 102 but applies to State Legislatures. It includes:

Clause (1)(e): A member is disqualified if they are disqualified under any law made by Parliament—thus incorporating the provisions of the Tenth Schedule into state-level governance.

Paragraph-Wise Structure of the Tenth Schedule

Paragraph 1 – Interpretation Defines key terms:

"House": Either House of Parliament or State Legislature

"Legislature party": Member of the House belonging to a political party

"Original political party": The party a legislator belonged to before defection

Paragraph 2 – Disqualification on Ground of Defection Lays down the specific grounds for disqualification:

If a member voluntarily gives up their party membership or votes/abstains against party whip without permission and no condonation within 15 days [2(1)(a), 2(1)(b)]

If an independent member joins a political party after the election [2(2)]

If a nominated member joins any party after six months from taking the seat [2(3)]

Paragraph 3 – [Deleted] Originally allowed disqualification exemption in case of party splits (by one-third). Deleted by the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 to curb misuse.

Paragraph 4 – Merger Exception Exempts disqualification if a party merges with another and at least two-thirds of its legislators support it. Members who don’t join the new party but form a separate group are also protected. Cited in: Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra

Paragraph 5 – Exemption for Presiding Officers Speakers, Deputy Speakers, Chairmen, and Deputy Chairmen are exempted from disqualification if they give up party membership while in office and rejoin after ceasing to hold office.

Paragraph 6 – Decision-Making Authority Vests the power to decide on disqualification with the Speaker/Chairman. If their own disqualification is in question, the House elects another member to decide.

Paragraph 7 – Bar on Jurisdiction of Courts Initially barred judicial review of disqualification matters. However, in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, the Supreme Court declared this paragraph unconstitutional due to lack of ratification under Article 368(2), reaffirming that judicial review is part of the basic structure.

Paragraph 8 – Rule-Making Power Empowers the Speaker/Chairman to frame rules governing the procedure for disqualification, including timelines and inquiry formats.

Anti-Defection as defined in international instrument(s)

International instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) emphasize the importance of freedom of expression (Art. 19 UDHR/ICCPR), freedom of association (Art. 20 UDHR, Art. 22 ICCPR), and the right to participate in public affairs (Art. 25 ICCPR). These rights form the bedrock of representative democracy, enabling elected representatives to act according to conscience and constituents’ will.

However, as highlighted in the Constitution of Bangladesh (Article 70), the anti-defection law curtails these freedoms by disallowing Members of Parliament from voting against their party, even if it means representing the best interests of their electorate. While such laws aim to maintain political stability, they risk transforming parliamentary systems into "elected dictatorships" by inhibiting dissent and deliberation within the legislature (Chowdhury, 2019, p. 370).

The Bangladeshi experience underscores a broader concern in several developing democracies—where laws meant to prevent instability inadvertently suppress democratic norms. As Halim (2009) notes, in countries like Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, political defections stem from systemic issues like opportunism and weak party ideologies, which international standards do not directly regulate but which clash with the ideals of democratic representation and institutional accountability.

Thus, while international instruments do not explicitly define or endorse anti-defection laws, the conflict between such domestic laws and international democratic norms raises important questions about balancing stability with representative freedom.

Anti-Defection as defined in case law(s)

The landmark judgment of the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Others (1992 SCR (1) 686) laid down critical judicial interpretations of key terms and doctrines within the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, which governs disqualification on grounds of defection. One of the central phrases—“voluntarily giving up membership”—was expansively interpreted by the Court to mean not only formal resignation from a political party, but also any conduct that implicitly or explicitly indicates disloyalty, such as public criticism or defiance of party directives. The Court also examined the phrase “any direction” under Paragraph 2(1)(b), noting that it must not be used in a manner that excessively restricts an elected representative’s right to dissent and freedom of speech, which are essential components of parliamentary democracy.

Significantly, the Court scrutinized the finality of the Speaker’s decision under Paragraph 6(1). Although the Tenth Schedule initially claimed that the Speaker’s or Chairman’s decision would be final, the Court held that this finality does not preclude judicial review. It clarified that decisions made by the Speaker are subject to challenge under Articles 136, 226, and 227 of the Constitution in instances of mala fide action, perversity, or violation of constitutional mandates. The Court thus reaffirmed judicial review as part of the Constitution’s basic structure. Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule, which attempted to bar courts from intervening in disqualification matters, was struck down on the grounds that it curtailed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts and had not been ratified by half of the states, as required by the proviso to Article 368(2). By applying the doctrine of severability, the Court preserved the rest of the Tenth Schedule while invalidating only Paragraph 7.

The judgment also addressed the impartiality of the Speaker, acknowledging the potential for bias since Speakers often maintain party affiliations. However, the Court did not remove their adjudicatory role but emphasized that the availability of judicial review serves as a check against misuse of power. In essence, Kihoto Hollohan defined and clarified the operational scope of anti-defection provisions, balancing the need for political stability and party discipline with constitutional values of representative democracy, judicial oversight, and individual freedom of expression within legislative bodies.

International Experience

Defections and floor-crossing have historically posed challenges to political stability across the world, prompting many democracies to introduce anti-defection laws. Both internal considerations—such as preventing frequent government collapses—and external influences from the broader Commonwealth tradition have shaped these legal responses. These laws generally penalize elected representatives for switching allegiances post-election, aiming to preserve governmental stability and respect the electoral mandate.

Notable instances of political instability caused by defections include the collapse of governments in Sri Lanka in 1964 and again in 2001, as well as party-switching crises in the United Kingdom, and frequent political upheavals in Indian states such as Goa (1989), Sikkim (1994), and Arunachal Pradesh (1999, 2003). Such events underscore the destabilizing effects defections can have on both ruling governments and oppositions.

In modern representative democracies, particularly those following proportional representation systems, anti-defection laws are viewed as mechanisms to uphold the integrity of electoral outcomes. Candidates often owe their electoral success to party ideologies, campaign support, and manifestos, creating an implied duty of loyalty to the party and its voters.

However, the global experience also brings forth important democratic concerns. Critics argue that anti-defection laws, while ensuring party discipline, may curtail legislators’ freedom of speech, conscience, and individual accountability to their constituents. These criticisms highlight an enduring tension between the objectives of government stability and democratic responsiveness, making it crucial to design anti-defection mechanisms that respect both institutional integrity and individual autonomy.

91st Amendment Act, 2003

The 91st amendment act 2003 was passed to stop political defamation and to limit the size of the council of minister. It removes the exception that allowed a group split without disqualification Capped the number of ministers to 15% of the total members in parliament or state assemblies ,and barred defectors from holding ministerial or other remunerative, political post.The purpose was to reduce jumbo cabinets, prevents misuse of office for political gain and promotes stable and ethical governance

The impact of 91st amendment act on political defection in India, where Strengthening anti- defection law, Reduce insensitive for promote political stability, Limited cabinet size mix result in practice.

Removal of the provision for exemption in case of a split

• 91st amendment act 2003 refers to the major change in India anti-defection law. Before this amendment. The 10th schedule of the Constitution allowed that if at least one third of the members of a Legislature party splits from their party, they would not be disqualified from defection This was known as split provision.The 91st amendment act. 2023 deleted this exemption .Now,members who split from their party, regardless of their number are disqualified under the anti-defection law. Only a merger is exempt and for a valid “merger”. At least two-thirds of the members of the Legislature party must agree to it. This change was made to prevent miss use of the split provision.
• The 91st amendment act. 2023 deleted this exemption .Now,members who split from their party, regardless of their number are disqualified under the anti-defection law. Only a merger is exempt and for a valid “merger”. At least two-thirds of the members of the Legislature party must agree to it. This change was made to prevent miss use of the split provision which had led to frequent defection and political instability.

Issues with the Anti-Defection Law

The Anti-Defection Laws made the legislators accountable primarily to their political party and secondarily to the public. The Anti-Defection Laws are vague about the timeframe for action by the Speaker/Chairman. After the enactment of the Anti-Defection Law, the legislator is bound to follow the whip issued by the party blindly and has no freedom to vote. The Anti-Defection laws allow wholesale defection, but individual defection is not allowed. Amendments are required to fill the loopholes.

Data challenges

Speaker’s Role and the Challenge of Impartiality

One of the most pressing concerns in the implementation of the anti-defection law lies in the concentration of power in the hands of the Speaker or Presiding Officer. While constitutionally designated to decide on disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker is often a senior member of the ruling party or its coalition partner. This dual role raises valid concerns about impartiality. Political allegiance may influence both the timing and outcome of decisions, leading to delays or biased rulings that often favor the ruling government. This compromises the fairness and credibility of the disqualification process.

Delayed Decisions Undermine the Law

A recurring issue is the inordinate delay by Speakers in adjudicating disqualification petitions. In several cases, Speakers have sat on petitions for months or even years, allowing defecting legislators to remain in office and even contest subsequent elections. Often, such delays are strategic rather than procedural, driven by political convenience. This defeats the very purpose of the anti-defection law, which is to ensure stability and ethical conduct in representative democracy. The Supreme Court, in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020), explicitly held that Speakers should ideally decide such cases within three months, but this direction lacks statutory force and remains largely unimplemented.

Suppression of Dissent and Impact on Free Speech

The Tenth Schedule mandates that members must follow the party’s whip during legislative voting. While intended to preserve party discipline, this has unintended consequences. It often restricts legislators from expressing dissenting views, even when such dissent aligns with public interest or personal conscience. This rigid adherence to party lines limits the deliberative function of Parliament, reducing the scope of debate and dissent. Critics argue that this stifles the essence of parliamentary democracy and undermines the freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Research that engages with Anti-defection Law

Anatomy of India’s Anti-Defection Law (VIDHI)

The research report by VIDHI (VCPL)

India’s anti-defection law, codified in the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, was introduced to curb opportunistic party-switching by elected legislators and uphold electoral integrity. Though upheld as constitutional, the law has often failed in practice, enabling rather than deterring mass defections. A key flaw lies in the merger exemption, which permits group defections without penalty. Notably, in 2016, 43 Congress MLAs in Arunachal Pradesh merged with the PPA and later joined the BJP, avoiding disqualification. Similarly, Maharashtra’s 2022 crisis saw over 30 MLAs, led by Eknath Shinde, split from the Shiv Sena, sparking disqualification proceedings that remain unresolved, raising concerns about delayed enforcement and the law’s efficacy.

Laws Against Party Switching, Defecting, or Floor-Crossing in National Parliaments

This working Paper is written by Kenneth Janda

Anti-defection laws, which penalize legislators for switching parties, are uncommon in established democracies but prevalent in newer democracies, where they are seen as tools to stabilize volatile party systems. While scholars and politicians argue such laws curb political opportunism and strengthen party discipline, their inclusion in constitutions raises concerns, as constitutions are typically meant for enduring principles—not temporary political fixes.

ANTI-DEFECTION LAW: A DEATH KNELL FOR PARLIAMENTARY DISSENT?

This Paper is written by Kartik Khanna & Dhvani Shah

Paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution penalizes legislators for disobeying party whips during voting, but its broad language has suppressed free speech and dissent in Parliament. This provision blurs the line between legitimate dissent and defection, weakening parliamentary debate and contributing little to party stability or reducing corruption. Despite the Supreme Court’s observations in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, reforms have been ineffective. The paper argues for a constitutional amendment—not repeal—to narrowly define the conditions under which disqualification for defying the whip should apply, aligning Indian law more closely with American and British democratic norms.

UNBOTTLING DISSENT: SCRAPPING THE ANTI DEFECTION LAW

This paper is written by Ayush Kashyap

Defection in Indian politics is widely associated with corruption and moral decline, prompting the eventual enactment of the anti-defection law after years of delay and debate. Though it withstood judicial scrutiny, its implementation—particularly the unchecked authority of the Speaker and the flawed merger exemption—has undermined its purpose. The law has often failed to curb unethical political behavior and instead weakened democratic norms. In contrast to India's rigid stance, the paper advocates a more liberal, laissez-faire approach that trusts the electorate to hold defectors accountable, encourages legitimate dissent, and preserves institutional balance.

ANTI- DEFECTION LAW- HITHERTO SHIFTS AND CHALLENGES IT

This paper is written by Dr. Navna Singh & Khushnoor Kaur

The anti-defection law, introduced in India in 1985 via the 52nd Constitutional Amendment, aimed to curb rampant political defections symbolized by slogans like "aaya ram gaya ram." Despite its intent, defections persist, driven by power and inducements. The law grants excessive power to the Speaker—often politically biased—and restricts judicial review, raising concerns of arbitrariness. Additionally, it suppresses legislators' freedom to dissent against party wrongs. This paper examines the law's evolution, its ongoing shortcomings, and proposes reforms to foster a cleaner, more democratic political environment.

International Experience

Defections and floor-crossing have historically posed challenges to political stability across the world, prompting many democracies to introduce anti-defection laws. Both internal considerations—such as preventing frequent government collapses—and external influences from the broader Commonwealth tradition have shaped these legal responses. These laws generally penalize elected representatives for switching allegiances post-election, aiming to preserve governmental stability and respect the electoral mandate.

Notable instances of political instability caused by defections include the collapse of governments in Sri Lanka in 1964 and again in 2001, as well as party-switching crises in the United Kingdom, and frequent political upheavals in Indian states such as Goa (1989), Sikkim (1994), and Arunachal Pradesh (1999, 2003). Such events underscore the destabilizing effects defections can have on both ruling governments and oppositions.

In modern representative democracies, particularly those following proportional representation systems, anti-defection laws are viewed as mechanisms to uphold the integrity of electoral outcomes. Candidates often owe their electoral success to party ideologies, campaign support, and manifestos, creating an implied duty of loyalty to the party and its voters.

However, the global experience also brings forth important democratic concerns. Critics argue that anti-defection laws, while ensuring party discipline, may curtail legislators’ freedom of speech, conscience, and individual accountability to their constituents. These criticisms highlight an enduring tension between the objectives of government stability and democratic responsiveness, making it crucial to design anti-defection mechanisms that respect both institutional integrity and individual autonomy.

Way Ahead

The recommendations put forth by the Halim Committee ,the Dinesh Goswami Committee & YB Chavan have had a profound impact on the discourse surrounding the current anti-defection law in India, although many of their principal recommendations remain only partially enacted or are still under discussion.

Influence of Halim committee Recommendation: -

The Halim Committee highlighted the necessity of precisely defining the terms 'voluntarily giving up membership' and 'political party' to eliminate ambiguity in disqualification cases. This has fuelled ongoing demands for clearer legal definitions within the Tenth Schedule, yet a comprehensive statutory definition has yet to be established.

Furthermore, it suggested transferring the authority to adjudicate disqualification petitions from the Speaker of the House to an independent entity such as the Election Commission to guarantee impartiality. This recommendation has been reiterated in subsequent reports and judicial decisions, but the Speaker continues to retain this authority, raising concerns regarding potential bias.

Additionally, the committee proposed limitations on expelled members, including a ban on joining another party or holding government office, which has shaped discussions on enhancing the law's deterrent effect.

Influence of Dinesh Goswami Committee Recommendation

Similarly, the Dinesh Goswami Committee advised that disqualification should be confined to instances of voluntary resignation from the party and voting against the party whip solely during confidence or no-confidence motions. This has influenced the current law's emphasis on these specific grounds, although the law is applied more broadly to include voting against party directives in other situations.

It was proposed that the President or Governor should determine disqualification cases based on the recommendations of the Election Commission, with the intention of minimizing political bias. This proposal has not been enacted, as the Speaker continues to serve as the adjudicating authority, despite significant criticism.

The committee also recommended that party whips be issued solely in critical circumstances where the stability of the government is threatened, a principle that has been echoed in subsequent calls to restrict the issuance of whips to prevent misuse.

Overall Impact and Status

While many of the committee's suggestions have been reflected in discussions and reform initiatives—such as demands for timely resolutions on defection cases, clearer definitions, and independent adjudication mechanisms—

However Speaker still holds the position of the sole adjudicator. This situation has been a point of contention, as highlighted by the Supreme Court and various commissions, indicating a failure to implement the Halim and Goswami recommendations for independent tribunals or adjudication by the Election Commission.

Additionally, the provisions concerning splits and mergers remain contentious; both the Halim Committee and later Law Commission reports have suggested eliminating exemptions for splits and mergers to avert misuse, yet these provisions persist in the law and are frequently exploited to bypass disqualification.

The anti-defection law continues to attract criticism for restricting legislators' ability to vote according to their conscience and for exhibiting political bias in adjudication, issues that the committees aimed to rectify.

In conclusion, while the Halim and Dinesh Goswami Committees have profoundly shaped the discourse on anti-defection law reform, many of their key recommendations, especially regarding adjudication authority and clearer definitions, await full legislative or constitutional implementation. The law today reflects a partial incorporation of their ideas but continues to face challenges related to impartiality, clarity, and effectiveness

Influence of Y.B. Chavan Committee Recommendations

The recommendations put forth by the Y.B. Chavan Committee played a crucial role in shaping India's anti-defection law, influencing its objectives and several essential provisions:

• The committee recognized that defections were primarily driven by the lure of office or financial incentives, with numerous defectors receiving ministerial roles as rewards. To address this issue, it proposed that any member who defects for such reasons should be expelled from Parliament and prohibited from contesting elections for a designated duration.

• It suggested imposing a one-year ban on defecting legislators from holding ministerial positions or until they are re-elected, aiming to diminish the temptation of office as a reason for defection.

• The committee characterized defection as the voluntary renunciation of allegiance to the political party under whose symbol the legislator was elected, except in cases where such action stemmed from a party decision.

• It also recommended the establishment of a smaller Council of Ministers at both the central and state levels to limit opportunities for rewarding defectors.

• In the wake of the committee's report, initial legislative efforts were made to address defections, although these attempts were not successful at first. Ultimately, the anti-defection law was enacted through the 52nd Amendment in 1985, incorporating many of the committee's concerns, including the disqualification of defectors and restrictions on ministerial appointments for them.

• The committee's recommendations led to the removal of the one-third split provision, which had permitted certain defections without disqualification, and shifted the law's emphasis towards political stability and party loyalty.

• The 2003 amendment to the law further integrated the committee's suggestions by capping the size of the Council of Ministers and preventing defectors from joining the Council immediately without re-election

The Y.B. Chavan Committee characterized political defection as the voluntary renunciation of loyalty to the political party under whose emblem a legislator was elected, except in cases where such action is sanctioned by the party itself. This definition encompasses not only formal resignations but also instances where a legislator's behaviour suggests a departure from their party loyalty. Furthermore, the committee noted that numerous defections were driven by the temptation of office, with many defectors receiving ministerial roles as a reward. To address this issue, it proposed prohibiting defectors from assuming ministerial positions for a period of one year or until they are re-elected.

In conclusion, the Y.B. Chavan Committee's definition of defection entails a legislator's voluntary abandonment of party allegiance, either overtly or subtly, unless permitted by the party.

Related terms

Defection is known by various names, such as floor crossing (in India and Pakistan), carpet crossing (in Nigeria), waka jumping (in New Zealand), and party hopping (in Malaysia)

Conclusion

The introduction of the Tenth Schedule in the Indian Constitution was aimed at curbing political defections. Though the law has succeeded reasonably due to some of its loopholes, it has not been able to achieve its best. Over the years the law has been examined by various committees and several recommendations have been given in their report e.g., the Dinesh Goswami committee report (1990), Hashim Abdul Halim committee report (1994), 170th report of the Law Commission of India (1999), Report of the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution of India (2002), Hashim Abdul Halim committee report (2003), and 255th report of the Law Commission of India (2015). We need the regulations of the 10th schedule with strict directions that adhere to lucidity and accountability in a democracy. It should be very clear; there should be no ambiguity in the minds of those trying to play around with it. It is also the need of the hour to make legislation governing the political parties. However, the anti-defection law made stability in the government, which in turn decreased corruption and steered the focus of the legislators towards governance to some extent.

Refernces

1. https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2019/11/13/breaking-karnataka-mlas-disqualification-case-sc-upholds-speakers-order-but-allows-disqualified-mlas-to-contest-by-elections
2. Subash C Kashyap: Anti Defection Law and Parliamentary Privileges, N. M. Tripathi.
3. http://14.139.60.116:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/17560/1/061_Anti-Defection%20Law%20and%20Parliamentary%20Privileges%20%281993%29%20%28531-535%29.pdf
4. https://ili.ac.in/pdf/7.pdf
5. Malhotra, G.C. (2005). Anti-Defection Law in India and the Commonwealth. Lok Sabha Secretariat. Retrieved from https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/58674/1/Anti_Defection_Law.pdf
6. https://prsindia.org/articles-by-prs-team/the-anti-defection-law-that-does-not-aid-stability
7. https://prsindia.org/articles-by-prs-team/explained-the-limits-of-anti-defection
8. https://indianculture.gov.in/reports-proceedings/report-committee-defections
9. https://cnlu.ac.in/storage/2025/04/Anti-Defection-Law-Hitherto-Shifts-and-Challenges-It-Poses-by-Dr.-Navna-Singh-Khushnoor-Kaur.pdf
10. ANTI- DEFECTION LAW- HITHERTO SHIFTS AND CHALLENGES IT POSES