Electronic Voting
What is ‘Electronic Voting’
Electronic voting encompasses the use of electronic systems to cast, record, and tabulate votes, supplanting traditional paper-based methods to bolster efficiency, precision, and electoral integrity. In India, this is epitomized by Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), standalone, battery-operated devices engineered by the Electronics Corporations of India Limited (ECIL)and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) under the aegis of the Election Commission of India (ECI)
These machines mitigate perennial challenges of paper ballots, including exorbitant printing and logistics costs, protracted manual counting, susceptibility to fraud such as booth capturing via counterfeit ballots, and invalid votes from erroneous marking. EVMs foster elevated voter participation, particularly among socio-economically disadvantaged and illiterate demographics, through intuitive interfaces featuring candidate symbols and buttons. They curtail electoral malfeasance, expedite result announcements, and diminish long-term election expenditures despite upfront investments. India's deployment of electronic voting accommodates its colossal electorate exceeding 900 million, facilitating expeditious and dependable outcomes in the globe's preeminent democracy.
Official Definition of ‘Electronic Voting’
According to the Election Commission of India (ECI), an Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) is a standalone electronic device used to record and count votes during elections. Indian EVMs (ECI-EVMs) are designed and manufactured under strict ECI specifications by state-owned entities such as Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL).
Electronic voting in India is governed by the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (amended to insert Section 61A, in 1989 to include EVMs), and the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. The system is designed to be tamper-resistant, with no external connectivity, ensuring that elections are free, fair, and reliable.
Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs)
Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) are battery-powered, self-contained devices developed collaboratively by the ECI, ECIL, and BEL to replace paper ballots, tackling challenges like voter illiteracy, logistical burdens in transporting and storing millions of ballots, and electoral fraud. These machines use write-once-read-many (WORM) memory to store votes securely without allowing alterations, and they incorporate features like vote rate limits (maximum five votes per minute) to prevent booth capturing. EVMs have evolved to support larger candidate lists and integrate verification mechanisms, making them a cornerstone of India's electoral system since their nationwide rollout.
“To hold democratic, free and fair elections in India is an amazing and a daunting task. In the 2014 elections, 66.4 % from total eligible electorate of 834,101,479 cast their vote”.
With a voting body over two and a half times the population of the United States handling an Indian election in any means seems logistically impossible let alone holding one electronically. However, India, the world’s largest democracy, manages to hold elections exclusively electronically and see an increase in voter turnout and vote legitimacy as a byproduct.
Structure and Components of EVM
The EVM consists of two primary interconnected units: the Ballot unit (BU), placed in a private voting compartment for voter interaction, and the Control Unit (CU), operated by the polling officer. These are linked by a five-meter cable for secure, one-way communication.
The BU features a screen displaying candidate names, symbols, and corresponding blue buttons for selection, along with indicator lights (red for busy, green for ready), Braille signage for visually impaired voters, and an internal clock for timestamping events. It can handle up to 16 candidates per unit, with up to 24 units connectable to one CU in modern versions, supporting up to 384 candidates.
The CU manages the voting process, stores encrypted vote data in its memory (retaining up to 2000 votes per machine for over 10 years), displays totals via LED screens, and includes buttons like "Ballot" to activate the BU and "Result" (sealed until counting) to retrieve outcomes. Modern M3 EVMs integrate a Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) unit, powered by a 7.5-volt alkaline battery to eliminate external power needs and reduce tampering risks. The system lacks any operating system, wireless connectivity, or external interfaces, ensuring isolation from hacking attempts. Additional components include a totaliser for aggregating results from multiple EVMs to mask booth-level data, preventing targeted reprisals.
Historical Development and Evolution of EVMs in India
The development of EVMs began in the late 1970s to address rampant issues with paper ballots, including booth capturing, invalid votes, and logistical nightmares in India's vast elections. In 1977, the ECI initiated the project, tasking ECIL with creating a prototype, which was demonstrated to political parties in 1980. Manufacturing responsibilities were assigned to BEL and ECIL.
The first field trial occurred in May 1982 during a by-election in Paravur, Kerala, at 50 polling stations, but a Supreme Court ruling deemed it unconstitutional without legal amendments, as existing laws specified paper ballots. This led to the 1988 amendment to the Representation of the People Act (effective 1989) and updates to election rules in 1992. Experimental use expanded in 1998 across 25 constituencies in three states, followed by full state-level deployment in 2001 elections in Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Puducherry, and West Bengal. Nationwide implementation came in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections, covering 543 constituencies with over a million EVMs for 380 million voters.
Evolutions include three generations:
M1 (1989-2006, basic design), M2 (2006-2010, with enhanced connectivity for multiple BUs and VVPAT compatibility), and M3 (post-2013, with tamper-detection, self-diagnostics, and built-in VVPAT hoods for environmental protection). By 2017, the ECI planned to phase out older models, with most current machines being M3. Additional innovations like the 2008 totaliser unit aggregate results to protect voter anonymity at the booth level.
Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)
The Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) is an independent printer system attached to EVMs, introduced to provide a physical record for voter verification and auditing, addressing transparency concerns in electronic voting.
Mandated by a 2013 Supreme Court directive in response to representational petitions advocating verifiable audit mechanisms, VVPAT empowers electors to authenticate congruence between their electronic selection and the printed manifestation.
Purpose and Functioning of VVPAT
VVPAT's core purpose is to enhance voter confidence by generating a paper slip that displays the selected candidate's serial number, name, and symbol for seven seconds through a transparent window, allowing verification before the slip is automatically cut and stored in a sealed ballot box. This creates an auditable paper trail independent of the EVM's electronic memory, enabling manual recounts in disputes. Unlike the EVM, VVPAT does not store data electronically; it only prints based on the vote signal.
Introduced after a 2010 expert committee recommendation, it was trialed in diverse terrains from 2011 and first used in a by-poll in 2013. The system mitigates risks of electronic errors or tampering by providing a fallback for verification, with trials showing 100% match rates between slips and EVM counts.
Integration of VVPAT with EVMs
VVPAT integrates with the EVM via a cable connected to the Ballot Unit, synchronizing to print a slip immediately after a vote is cast on the BU, without altering the EVM's standalone nature. In M2 and M3 EVMs, software modifications enable this attachment, with the VVPAT unit featuring a built-in hood to protect against light and heat. Since the 2013 Supreme Court directive, VVPAT rollout was phased: used in select constituencies in 2014, expanded progressively, and mandatory nationwide by 2019.
A 2019 Supreme Court ruling requires counting slips from five randomly selected EVMs per assembly constituency (increased from one) to verify electronic results, ensuring statistical confidence. If discrepancies arise, full manual counts may be ordered. This integration adds a layer of transparency, though challenges like a 15% failure rate in VVPAT units persist.
Operation of EVMs
EVM operations are meticulously outlined in the ECI's Manual on Electronic Voting Machines, ensuring uniformity, security, and transparency across all phases of elections.
Election Process Using EVMs
The process begins with secure storage and random allocation of EVMs to polling stations via the EVM Management System. Before polling, machines undergo First Level Checking (FLC) and a mock poll of at least 50 votes (often 1000 for thoroughness) in the presence of political agents to verify zero pre-recorded votes and functionality. On election day, voter identity is confirmed using documents, thumb impressions, and the ECI database.
The polling officer presses the "Ballot" button on the CU to activate the BU, allowing the voter to select a candidate privately; a beep confirms the vote, and the VVPAT slip is displayed. Post-polling, the CU is sealed to lock further inputs, and units are transported to strong rooms. Counting occurs at designated centers: the "Result" button is unsealed, totals displayed, and VVPAT slips from selected machines manually verified. Results are aggregated, potentially using totalizers for anonymity, and certified only after verification.
Training and Operational Guidelines
The ECI mandates comprehensive training for polling officials, covering EVM assembly, troubleshooting, mock polls, sealing procedures, and VVPAT handling. Training includes simulations under varying environmental conditions to ensure reliability. Operational guidelines emphasize real-time tracking via apps like the Voter Turnout App, secure transportation, and post-poll audits. Officials must conduct FLC with technicians from BEL/ECIL, randomizing machines twice to prevent targeting. Guidelines also address contingencies like malfunctions, requiring repolls if unresolved, and stress voter education on VVPAT verification to boost confidence.
Official Security Reviews and Audits
The ECI conducts ongoing security reviews, asserting EVMs' tamper-proof nature due to their standalone design and multi-layered protocols.
Technical Safeguards and Encryption Standards
Technical safeguards include one-time programmable (OTP) chips that cannot be rewritten, absence of wireless or OS components to prevent remote hacks, encrypted data storage, vote rate limits, and tamper-evident seals. Units feature unique IDs, mutual authentication in M3 models, and self-diagnostics. Firmware is burned at manufacturing, with black-box testing ensuring integrity. Randomization and FLC add layers, while VVPAT provides independent verification.
Institutional Oversight: Election Commission and Expert Committees
Oversight involves the ECI's Technical Expert Committee (TEC) of IIT professors and experts, reviewing designs and conducting audits. Hackathons (e.g., 2017) demonstrate resilience, though criticized for restrictions. VVPAT slip counts, inventory tracking, and judicial mandates ensure accountability. International comparisons and bug bounties are suggested for further robustness.
Challenges and Controversies
Despite safeguards, EVMs face significant challenges and controversies, including potential vulnerabilities and political distrust.
Concerns about Tampering and Transparency
Critics highlight physical tampering risks, such as CPU replacement with hackable chips or Bluetooth devices by insiders during manufacturing, storage, or checks. Supply chain vulnerabilities from foreign chipmakers, storage in insecure warehouses (with reported thefts and discrepancies), and malfunction rates (e.g., 15% VVPAT failures) raise alarms. Lack of end-to-end verifiability and reliance on small VVPAT samples undermine transparency, with experts noting possibilities of Trojans or clip-on devices for vote manipulation.
Judicial and Political Debates
Political parties across spectra have questioned EVMs post-losses, with BJP alleging rigging in 2009 and opposition parties in 2017-2019. Judicially, the Supreme Court ruled against early use in 1982 but upheld amended laws; 2013 and 2019 directives mandated VVPAT and increased verification. Global bans (e.g., Germany 2009) fuel debates, with petitions dismissed for lack of evidence but calls for better audits persisting.
Reforms and Future Directions
Reformative imperatives encompass universal VVPAT instantiation since 2019, escalation of voucher tabulation to quinquennial per segment, and postulational frameworks for probabilistic sampling (e.g., 95% confidence intervals) toward authentication. Proffered ameliorations include fortified custodianship, authenticity actuators for genuineness assays, adversarial probings by transnational consortia, and prospective transposition to optical mark-recognition paper modalities.
Empirical validations for remote balloting via multi-constituency EVMs address migrant disenfranchisement, whilst blockchain explorations target fortified security. The High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections posits logistical synergies, potentially leveraging EVMs for concurrent parliamentary and assembly polls. Exportations to polities such as Nepal and Bhutan evince transnational approbation, with M3 supplanting consummated by 2024. As of 2025, ongoing consultations address voter roll manipulations and enhanced transparency measures amid allegations of systemic misconduct in recent state elections.
Electronic Voting in Official Databases
Data on electronic voting is housed in ECI databases, including annual reports on EVM deployments, voter turnout via the Voter Turnout App, election results on the ECI website, and audit details. Legal histories, manuals, and specifications are accessible on eci.gov.in, with real-time tracking and historical data on usage, verifications, and inventories.
References
- "LEGAL HISTORY OF EVMs AND VVPATs". Election Commission of India. November 2022. https://www.eci.gov.in/eci-backend/public/uploads/monthly_2022_11/10386732_LegalHistoryofEVMsandVVPATs_pdf.a942a6ed2e36892f92adecb5e88f6d3d.
- "Electronic Voting Machine - General Q/A". Election Commission of India. https://www.eci.gov.in/evm-faq.
- "Use of EVM in the elections". Election Commission of India. https://hindi.eci.gov.in/files/file/99-use-of-evm-in-the-elections-additional-transparency-measures/?do=download&r=230&confirm=1&t=1&csrfKey=f6aa621d203c01b81761e05453a34163.
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- "Supreme Court junks plea for 100% manual counting of VVPAT slips ...". The Hindu. April 7, 2025. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-junks-plea-for-100-manual-counting-of-vvpat-slips-during-polls/article69422465.ece.
- "J U D G M E N T - Supreme Court of India". Supreme Court of India. May 24, 2024. https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2023/10857/10857_2023_2_1501_52646_Judgement_26-Apr-2024.pdf.
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- "Manual on Electronic Voting Machine - CEO DAMAN". Chief Electoral Officer, Daman. May 4, 2023. https://ceodaman.nic.in/Document-2023/EVM%2520Manual%2520August%25202023%2520final.pdf.
- "EVM Manual August 2023". Election Commission of India. https://www.eci.gov.in/eci-backend/public/uploads/ebooks/Manual-on-EVM/mobile/index.html.
- "Manual EVM Book.pdf - CEO Manipur". Chief Electoral Officer, Manipur. https://ceomanipur.nic.in/resources/Manual/Manual%2520EVM%2520Book.pdf.
