Statelessness
What is Statelessness
A person is stateless if they do not have a nationality of any country, i: e they are not recognized as a citizen of any country[1]. Statelessness is often used to refer to refugees or asylum seekers, who have renounced or have been expelled from their home country, but are yet to be formally recognized by the government of the country they fled to as their citizens. Some prominent examples of stateless groups include the Kurdish people and Myanmar's Rohingya Minority.

Official Definition of Statelessness
India does not have any official legal framework to deal with ‘stateless’ persons. In the Indian context then, de facto statelessness would refer to persons living in India who do not qualify to be an Indian citizen under India’s Citizenship Act 1955, and at the same time are not citizens of India. According to the Indian Citizenship Act, citizenship can be acquired by way of birth, naturalization, registration descent and incorporation of territory. The Act states that any ‘foreigner’ lacking ‘without a valid passport or other travel documents and such other document or authority as may be prescribed by or under any law in that behalf’ is an ‘illegal migrant’. Section 6 of the Act specifically prohibits ‘illegal immigrants’ from gaining citizenship by way of naturalization. Thus such ‘illegal immigrants’ end up de facto stateless.
Statelessness as Defined in Legislation(s)
There is almost no official definition of the term "Stateless" or "Statelessness" in Indian Legislation. However, it does find one mention in Passport Rules, 1980.
Passport Rules, 1980.
The only explicit mention of the term can be found in the Schedule II Part II of Passport Rules 1980, which states "stateless persons residing in India, foreigners, whose country is not represented in India, or whose national status is in doubt may qualify for a ‘Certificate of Identity." The Passports Act is by far the most advanced Indian legislation relating to statelessness, as it is the only law so far that recognizes such persons in their own category and provides them with an identification document.[2]
Legal provision(s) relating to Statelessness
There are no legal provision for statelessness per se. The closest alternatives to stateless persons found in the legal framework are ‘foreigners’. According to Section 2(a) of Foreigners Act, 1946, “ “foreigner” means a person who is not a citizen of India”. Its successor, Section 2(f) of The Immigration and Foreigner’s Act, 2025 offers the same definition.
While de jure stateless is not recognized in India, de facto statelessness does exist in India. As per the Assam Accords, or more specifically Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, people who migrated to Assam from East Pakistan between 1947 and 1966 are automatically entitled to citizenship, and people who migrated between 1966 and 1971 are to be allowed to stay in India and classified as foreigners. The latter can obtain Indian citizenship after ten years.
Statelessness as Defined in Case Laws
Judgements with regards to de facto stateless persons in India have followed a principle of differential treatment. For instance, the Supreme Court had ruled that Chakmas– community who had crossed over to India in 1964 from then East Pakistan, were entitled to state protection of their right to life and liberty as per Article 21. Furthermore, the court ruled that by not forwarding the Chakmas' citizenship applications to the concerned department within the Union government, their constitutional and statutory right to be considered for citizenship was being denied to them by the Arunachal State government. The Rohingyas in contrast have faced a completely different treatment. The Supreme Court while examining the case of Rohingya deportation, had in 2025 ruled that the right to reside anywhere within the country was limited only to citizens of India. Moreover it had refused to intervene in Rohingya deportations as it said that might have implications for national security.
Statelessness as defined in international instrument(s)
The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are the major instruments of International Law regarding statelessness. According to the 1954 Convention, “stateless” person refers to “a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of”. It also outlines a minimum standard of respect and treatment towards stateless persons, including with respect to the right to education, employment and housing; and guarantees stateless people a right to identity, travel documents and administrative assistance. The 1961 Convention on its part tries to reduce the number of stateless persons.
India is not party to either of the conventions.
The right to nationality has also been laid out in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Rights. Other International legal instruments which affirm the right of stateless persons include:
- the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
- the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
- the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
- the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
- the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women,
- the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
- the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.
Landmark Cases on Statelessness
Gangadhar Yeshwant Bhandare vs Erasmo De Jesus Sequiria (1975).
In Gangadhar Yeshwanth Bhandare, the Supreme Court was tasked with deciding a sensitive question concerning the citizenship status of the respondent, who hailed from one of the former Portuguese territories. Following the liberation of Goa and other Portuguese enclaves, individuals residing in these territories were required to comply with certain statutory procedures if they wished to be recognised as Indian citizens. The respondent, however, had not adhered to the timelines and technical requirements set forth under this framework, largely because he had been entrusted with a confidential mission on behalf of the Indian government. His participation in this mission, which was of national significance, caused delays in satisfying the formalities required under the law. On this basis, it was alleged that he continued to be a Portuguese national and therefore could not claim the status of an Indian citizen. The Supreme Court rejected this rigid view, taking note of the exceptional circumstances that had prevented the respondent from following the ordinary procedures. The Court emphasised that the respondent had already renounced his Portuguese nationality and that, in substance, his ties, allegiance, and obligations were entirely towards India. To treat him as a non-citizen merely on account of procedural delay would result in the unacceptable outcome of statelessness. The Court thus declared that he was indeed an Indian citizen. In doing so, it underscored the principle that the law on nationality must not be applied in a manner that produces unjust or anomalous results, particularly where an individual has clearly severed links with his prior nationality and has long been integrated within the Indian state. The judgment is significant because it reflects the judiciary’s willingness to interpret the law on citizenship in light of broader humanitarian considerations, rather than confining itself to a rigid statutory reading. By recognising that denying citizenship in such circumstances would leave the respondent stateless, the Court affirmed that constitutional and statutory provisions must be applied in a manner consistent with India’s obligations to prevent statelessness, even though the country is not a signatory to the Statelessness Conventions. The case thus stands as an early instance where the Supreme Court consciously chose to balance strict legal requirements with the higher principle of ensuring that no individual is left without a nationality.
Jan Balaz vs Anand Municipality (2009).
In Jan Balaz, the Gujarat High Court was confronted with the complex question of nationality and citizenship in the context of children born through surrogacy. The case involved twin children born in India to an Indian surrogate mother on behalf of a German couple. A central legal difficulty arose because Germany did not recognise surrogacy arrangements, which meant that the children could not automatically acquire German citizenship by birth. At the same time, uncertainty existed regarding their entitlement to Indian citizenship, as the legal framework under the Citizenship Act, 1955 did not specifically address the unique situation of children born through surrogacy to foreign nationals. This legal lacuna raised the alarming possibility that the children would be left without any recognised nationality, effectively stateless. The Gujarat High Court approached the matter with a liberal and purposive interpretation of the Citizenship Act, 1955. It held that the law must be applied in a manner that safeguards the basic rights and dignity of individuals, especially children, and that the Indian legal system could not allow them to fall into the condition of statelessness. The Court recognised that since the surrogate mother was Indian, and the children were born on Indian soil, they were entitled to be recognised as Indian citizens by birth. In doing so, the Court stressed that the principle of preventing statelessness should guide the interpretation of domestic nationality laws, particularly in cases where vulnerable individuals like children risk being left without any citizenship. The judgment is significant because it demonstrated judicial creativity in filling a legislative gap. By adopting a humanitarian approach, the Gujarat High Court affirmed that nationality cannot be denied to children merely because their birth circumstances involve modern reproductive technologies such as surrogacy. It also highlighted the obligation of states to interpret citizenship laws consistently with broader international human rights principles, even in the absence of explicit treaty obligations.
Prabhleen Kaur V. Union of India (2018).
In Prabhleen Kaur, the petitioner faced rejection of her passport renewal on the basis of a mere suspicion surrounding her nationality. The Delhi High Court found such reasoning deeply flawed, observing that denial of a passport on doubtful grounds could push an individual into a condition of statelessness, a consequence impermissible in law. The Court underscored that nationality cannot be taken away or denied on conjecture, and in the absence of definitive evidence proving otherwise, the petitioner could only be treated as an Indian national. It therefore held that her application could not be refused on the basis of unsubstantiated doubt, reaffirming the State’s duty to guard against statelessness.
Sheikh Abdul Aziz Case (2013).
The Delhi High Court in Sheikh Abdul Aziz (W.P. (Crl.) 1426/2013) dealt with a petitioner who remained in immigration detention long after serving his original sentence under the Foreigners Act. Efforts to establish his nationality had failed, leaving him in a legal limbo with no state claiming him as a citizen. The Court criticised the Government’s inaction in issuing a statelessness certificate, emphasising that such recognition was a necessary precursor to securing his release. It directed the authorities to issue the certificate and facilitate the grant of a Long-Term Visa, recognising that these steps were vital to prevent the petitioner from existing as an invisible figure outside the protection of law and community.
Dr. Ramesh Chennamaneni vs Union Of India (2019).
In Ramesh Chennamaneni, the Telangana High Court made a significant observation that the Government of India’s power to revoke citizenship under Section 10 of the Citizenship Act is not absolute, but subject to important limitations, foremost among them the obligation to prevent statelessness. Since the cancellation of the petitioner’s citizenship in that case would have left him without any nationality, the Court intervened and quashed the decision of the competent authority. Beyond instances where an individual risks statelessness due to the acts or omissions of the Indian state, the judiciary has also acknowledged the necessity of recognising the legal position of stateless persons residing in India who have been deprived of nationality by the actions of a foreign state.
National Human Rights Commission vs State Of Arunachal Pradesh & Anr [Chakma Case] (1996):
The Court in the Chakma judgment, NHRC v. State of Arunachal Pradesh (1996), was confronted with the difficult question of protecting the rights of a refugee community that had lived in India for decades without a clear legal status. The Chakma and Hajong communities had migrated from the Chittagong Hill Tracts of East Pakistan in the 1960s after their land was submerged by the Kaptai dam project. They were resettled in Arunachal Pradesh with the consent of the Union Government, but their presence soon became politically contentious. Local groups resisted their integration and mounted campaigns demanding their expulsion. The hostility culminated in threats, social boycotts and blockades, making it impossible for members of the community to exercise even basic rights. The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the State of Arunachal Pradesh was under a constitutional obligation to protect the Chakmas and ensure their access to the process of acquiring Indian citizenship under Section 5(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act. Despite their long residence in India, officials in the state refused to even accept their applications, thereby cutting them off from the statutory mechanism created to address their situation. The Court made it clear that while the actual grant of citizenship is a matter for the executive, the statutory right to have an application considered could not be denied. In its reasoning, the Court drew upon Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, both of which apply to all persons within Indian territory irrespective of nationality. It held that the life and liberty of the Chakmas had to be safeguarded and that any attempt to forcibly drive them out would amount to a violation of these guarantees. The Court therefore directed the Government of Arunachal Pradesh to ensure that their applications were duly received and forwarded for consideration by the Central Government. It also ordered that their security be protected from any form of harassment or coercion by local groups. The judgment affirmed the principle that constitutional protections are not restricted to citizens alone and that the state cannot abdicate its responsibility towards long-settled refugee communities. By insisting on procedural fairness and restraining arbitrary exclusion, the Court prevented the Chakmas from being rendered stateless and underscored the duty of the Indian state to deal with such questions in accordance with both law and human rights norms.
Namgyal Dolkar vs Government Of India (2010).
In a later matter, the Delhi High Court extended the reasoning adopted in the Chakma case to a petition filed by a Tibetan woman born in India in 1986 to refugee parents. The petitioner had been issued a stateless identity certificate, but the Court clarified that this classification did not preclude her entitlement to Indian citizenship by birth under Section 3(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act. Emphasising the statutory right conferred by her place of birth, the Court directed the Ministry of External Affairs to consider and decide her application without undue delay.
Kiran Gupta vs The State Election Commission (2020).
The case concerned a challenge to the Election Commission’s order setting aside the appellant’s Panchayat election victory on the ground that she was not an Indian citizen at the time of her election. She had originally been a Nepali national, but after her marriage to an Indian citizen she had lived in India for nearly two decades, raising her family here and holding documents such as a voter ID, PAN card, and property records in her name. She had even renounced her Nepali citizenship in 2016. However, she candidly acknowledged that she had never applied for Indian citizenship through registration under Section 5 of the Citizenship Act. Faced with these facts, the Court made clear that the grant of citizenship lies squarely within the domain of the Executive, since the statute prescribes the procedure and conditions for naturalisation and registration. The judiciary could not bypass these provisions and itself confer citizenship. Nonetheless, the Court did not treat the appellant’s plight lightly. She was left in a vulnerable position, stripped of formal recognition by both India and Nepal. In its reasoning, the Court underscored the broader obligation of the Indian state to avoid and mitigate statelessness, noting that while India has not ratified the two Statelessness Conventions, it remains bound by other human rights treaties it has accepted, such as the ICCPR, CEDAW, ICERD, and the CRC, which restrict arbitrary deprivation of nationality. Ultimately, while refusing to declare her an Indian citizen, the Court urged the Government to consider her unusual circumstances sympathetically should she pursue citizenship in the proper manner. The judgment is significant in showing how domestic courts can acknowledge and reinforce international commitments aimed at preventing statelessness, even in the absence of explicit treaty ratification.
Research That Engages with Statelessness
1) "Statelessness in India” by Social Conflict and Public Policy School of Public Policy and Governance TISS Hyderabad: A comprehensive TISS report examining the multifaceted causes, legal implications, and socio‑economic hardships of stateless people in India, alongside analyses of de jure and de facto statelessness and gaps in national protection. The report uses a qualitative methodology based on in-depth interviews, case studies, and legal analysis to explore experiences of statelessness across multiple Indian states.
2) “India and the Challenge of Statelessness: A Review of Legal Framework Related to Nationality” by National Law University Delhi- The publication offers a concise overview and critique of India’s nationality laws, examining constitutional provisions, statutory definitions, and administrative practices to highlight challenges and gaps in preventing and addressing statelessness. The methodology employs a black‑letter law approach, conducting an extensive desk‑based review of constitutional and statutory texts, international conventions, case law, NGO and UNHCR reports to analyze India’s nationality legal framework through the lens of statelessness.
3) "Statelessness And The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019: The Case of Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees" by Urvi Pathak -A focused study on how the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 and evolving jus soli vs. jus sanguinis norms in India have affected the statelessness of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, highlighting the legal conflation of refugees with “illegal migrants” and advocating judicial and legislative remedies. The article uses a doctrinal legal research methodology, analyzing constitutional provisions, statutes, case law, and international legal instruments to critique India’s citizenship regime as applied to Sri Lankan Tamils.
- ↑ Peter McMullin Centre on Statelessness, An Overview of Statelessness (Factsheet, Univ. of Melbourne, Feb. 2023), https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_File/0009/4460454/Statelessness_overview_factsheet_Feb_2023.pdf
- ↑ Asha Bangar, Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2017/02 (Institut on Statelessness and Inclusion, Working Paper, June 2017), https://files.institutesi.org/WP2017_02.pdf