Laches
What is the Doctrine of Laches?
It is a doctrine grounded in equity, and is intended to discourage unreasonable delays in the presentation of claims and enforcement of rights. The Court, when applying the doctrine of laches, will reject claims that have been brought forward with unreasonable delay. However, not all delays will be disqualified under the doctrine of laches. The nature of the delay must be unreasonable, i.e., it has changed the situation such that late enforcement of rights would be unfair. Therefore, delays that cause no harm to the other party would not be considered unreasonable. However, the entire exercise of determining the reasonableness of the delay is up to the discretion of the Court.[1]
Laches in the Writ Jurisdiction of High Court/Supreme Court
The ground of laches is generally taken in the High Court and Supreme Court when exercising their writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and Article 32 respectively. As the writ jurisdiction is not subject to the statute of limitations, the doctrine of laches is used in these Courts to deny reliefs sought after unreasonable delays.
Laches under Article 32
The Supreme Court in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi[2] rejected the Petitioner's claim for relief on the basis of delay. Chief Justice Hidayatullah opined that the Petitioner's deliberate move to pursue the remedy in appeal to the Supreme Court after 10 years of the High Court decision, only after another Supreme Court judgement had come out (which would have been favorable to the Petitioner's case), would result in the dismissal of the Petition on grounds of laches. He also noted -
"If then there is no period prescribed what is the standard for this Court to follow? I should say that utmost expedition is the sine qua non for such claims. The party aggrieved must move the Court at the earliest possible time and explain satisfactorily all semblance of delay. I am not indicating any period which may be regarded as the ultimate limit of action for that would be taking upon myself legislative functions. In England a period of 6 months has been provided statutorily, but that could be because there is no guaranteed remedy and the matter is one entirely of discretion. In India I will only say that each case will have to be considered on its own facts. Where there is appearance of avoidable delay and this delay affects the merits of the claim, this Court will consider it and in a proper case hold the party disentitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction."
Laches under Article 226
The Supreme Court in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller[3], dealing with an appeal from the High Court dismissing a Writ of Mandamus, held that a delay of 2 years had not been explained to the High Court, and even if the Petitioner's fundamental rights were involved, the High Court has the discretion to refuse relief to the Petitioner on the ground of Laches.
Differentiating Laches from Limitation
It is important to note that Laches is not the same as a limitation period. A limitation period is prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963 and works absolutely, unless the delay is condoned in accordance with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Laches, on the other hand, has been put into operation in a discretionary manner, differing with the facts of each case. Some instances of the interplay between Laches and Limitation will be enumerated herein:-
Analogy of Limitation where Applied
Courts have applied the limitation periods prescribed under the Limitation Act to disputes agitated under writ jurisdiction (where the Limitation Act has no applicability). For instance, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai[4], a dispute concerning tax refunds agitated under Article 226 before the HC, was found in favor of Petitioners that approached the Court within 3 years, and against Petitioner that approached the Court after 3 years. The justification for the differentiation between similarly placed parties was that a suit for recovery of money paid under mistake of law in the Limitation Act was prescribed as 3 years. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the High Court in creating such a differentiation and stated -
"Learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Art 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. The court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable."
Analogy of Limitation where not Applied
Courts have also dismissed Petitions moved under the Writ Jurisdiction, even if the limitation period for a civil action on the same matter of dispute has not elapsed. For instance, in Kamini Kumar v State of West Bengal[5], the High Court, under Article 226, was faced with a challenge against an order of dismissal which was brought 2 years after the order had been made - which would be within the limitation period of 3 years for a suit for declaration that the dismissal was wrongful. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held against the Petitioners on the grounds that in cases such as these, the Petitioner ought to have come before the High Court at the earliest possible opportunity. The Court stated -
"In the case before us, the most that the High Court could have done was to quash the order of dismissal and to leave the authorities free to take proceedings afresh against the appellant. The appellant would then have got another long period of years in front of him to go on contesting the validity of proceedings against him until he had gone past the age of retirement. In such cases, it is imperative, if the petitioner wants to invoke the extraordinary remedies available under Article 226 of the Constitution, that he should come to Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. If there is delay in getting an adjudication, a suit for damages actually sustained by wrongful dismissal may become the more or even the only appropriate means of redress. Every case depends upon its own facts."
- ↑ Alice Jacob, 'Laches: Denial of Judicial Relief under Articles 32 and 226' (1974) 16(3) Journal of the Indian Law Institute 352.
- ↑ Tilokchand & Motichand v H.B. Munshi (1969) 1 SCC 110
- ↑ Durga Prashad v Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (1969) 1 SCC 185
- ↑ State of M.P. v Bhailal Bhai 1964 SCC OnLine SC 10
- ↑ Kamini Kumar Das Choudhury v State of W.B. (1972) 2 SCC 420